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RECENT CASES.
CONTRACTS-AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY-BRADY V. YosT, 55 Pac. 542 (Idaho).-
Plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract whereby plaintiff, among other
things, agreed to obtain for the defendant the contract to print certain legal
notices for the United States. These legal notices were not required to be
published by the lowest bidder, and the price to be paid for them was fixed by
the government. The official in charge had a right to publish them in any
paper of general circulation in a given territory. Plaintiff used no improper
means to obtain the contract, and defendant published a paper of general cir-
culation within the required territory. Held, that the contract was not void
as against public policy.
CORPORATIONs-LIABILITY FOR CONTEMPT-PUNISHMENT--NwSP
A P ER ARTi-
CLE-PRoCEDURE---TELEG-Am NEWSPAPER CO. V. COM., ETC., 52 N. E. (Mass.)
445.-A newspaper, owned by a corporation, published an article during a trial
of a petition for the assessment of damages against a city for the taking of
petitioner's land, to the effect that the city had offered petitioner $8o for the
land at the time of taking, but he demanded $250. Held, that as this fact, if
true, was not admissible in evidence in the case, the article was calculated to
prejudice the jury and prevent a fair trial, and was, therefore, a contempt of
court.
CRIMINAL LAW--CAPITAL PUNISHMENT-QUALIFICATION OF VERDICT.-WINS-
TON v. U. S., z9 S. C. 212.-Revised Statutes, Section 5339, declares that
every person who commits murder in any place or district under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States shall suffer death; and Act July s, 1897,-29
(29 statute 487), provides that, in all cases in which the accused is found guilty
of murder under Section 5339, the jury may qualify their verdict by adding
thereto "without capital punishment." Held, that the latter provision author-
ized the jury to so limit their verdict in any case, without regard to the exist-
ence of mitigating circumstances, and that instructions confining the right to,
such cases were erroneous. Mr. Justice Brewer and Mr. Justice McKenna dis-
senting.
CRIMINAL LAw-PRIsoN DISCIPLINE-RIGHTs OF CoNvIcTs-Ex POST FAcT
LAWS.-MURPHY V. COMMONWEALTH, 52 N. B. (Mass.) 5o5.-A statute (Pub. St.
C. 222 q 20) authorized deductions to be made to prisoners convicted of
offenses while it was in force for good conduct and permits to be at liberty, on
certificate of the prison commissioners. Held, the statute was not a mere mat-
ter of prison discipline, but a grant to which prisoners were entitled as of
right, for faithful observance of the rules, and for not having been subjected
to punishment; and this, although the statute allowed the commissioners to,
revoke the permit without cause shown. And a subsequent statute which in
any way interferes with the privilege thus granted is, as to prisoners convicted
while the former statute was in force, exfjiostfacto, and void.
CRIMINAL PROCEDRE-APPEAL-DIsMISSAL-EscAPE.-PEoPLE v. ELKINS,
55 Pac. 599 (Cal.).-Defendant was convicted of murder and appealed from the.
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conviction. Pending the hearing of the appeal he escaped. On motion of the
Attorney-General an order was issued that the appeal stand dismissed unless
the defendant shall within thirty days return to custody.
EVIDENCE-CROSS-EXAMINATION.-DAV v. DONOHUE, 41 Atl. 934 (N. J.).-
Defendant, who was a master, being sued for negligence in furnishing material
for a scaffold, gave testimony which tended to show he had used ordinary
care. On cross-examination he was asked if he was insured against loss in
case the verdict went against him. Held, that it was within the discretion of
the trial court to allow the question. Van Syckel and Depue, J. J., dissented on
the ground that such testimony was immaterial and irrelevant.
EVIDENCE-CROSS-EXMINATION-PEOPLE v. DOLE, 55 Pac. 581 (Cal.).-De-
fendant on trial for forging a check testified in his own behalf that he won the
check in a game of poker. On cross-examination he was asked whether he
had stated this to the person who arrested him, or to the officer in whose cus-
tody he was placed, or to the person who informed him of the particular
charge against him. Held, that such question was proper. McFarland, Hen-
shaw and Temple, J. J., dissented on the ground that a man's silence to his
jailors can not be used against him.
INSOLVENCY-POWER OF ASSIGNEE-UNRECORDED MORTGAGE-NEWTOWN
SAVINGS BANK v. LAWRENCE, ET AL, 41 Atl. 1O54 (Conn.).-Under Conn. G. S.,
§ 2961, providing that no conveyance shall be effectual to hold lands against
any other person but the grantor and his heirs unless recorded, the assignee in
insolvency of the grantor may sell property free from an unrecorded mortgage
made by his assignor. Andrews, C. J., and Hammersley, J., dissented.
LIFz INSURANCE-CONTRACTs-FRAUDs--ECISSION-NEGLIGENCE-MCCARTY
v. N. Y. LIFE INS. Co., 77 N.W.Rep. 26 (Minn.).-An agent of the insurance com-
pany solicited the plaintiff to take out a policy of insurance upon his life, stating
the character and terms of the policy. Plaintiff agreed to take one of the kind
and terms described by the agent. Thereupon the agent filled out an "applica-
tion" and presented it to plaintiff for his signature; falsely representing to him
that it was an application for a policy of the character and terms which he had
described. Plaintiff signed the application withoutreading it, in reliance upon
the representations of the agent, and gave his promissory note in payment of
the premium. He did not read the policy for six weeks, when, upon discover-
ing that the terms were materially different from what they had been repre-
sented to be by the agent, he immediately returned the policy, requesting that
they cancel it and return to him his note. The company refused and trans-
ferred the note to an innocent indorsee, who recovered, and the plaintiff there-
upon brought suit to recover the value of the note. Held, notwithstanding
there was a stipulation requiring an alteration of one of their policies to be put
in writing, and submitted to the home office to render it valid, plaintiff could
recover. Inrurance Co. v Fletcher, X17 U. S. 59, 0. Sup. Ct. 837, distin-
guished. Negligence is not a good defense in an action of fraud between
the original parties to the contract. As to the contention that the parties
could not be placed in statu quo, plaintiff having been insured for six weeks,
and that the only remedy was an action for deceit, the court held that where
one party has obtained an unconscionable advantage over another by fraud,
and a recission would be in furtherance of justice, a recission may still be had,
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although the parties cannot in all respects be fully restored to their former
condition. Conlan v. Roemer, 52 N. J. L. 53, 18 At. 858; Hammond v.
Pennock, 61 N. Y., 145.
MASTER AND SERVANT-CoNrrRAcTs-AVOIDING LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE-
REIEASE--RAILROADS-JOHNSON V. CHARLESTOWN RY. CO., 32 S. E. Rep. 2,
(S. C.).-2 Const. x895, Art. 9, § 15, provides that railroad employdsshall have
the same rights and remedies for injuries suffered from the acts or omissions
of the corporation or certain employ6s as are allowed by law to persons not
employds, and that their representatives shall have the same right of action
for their death; that knowledge of any employ6 of the defective or unsafe con-
dition of ways, etc., shall be no defense to an action for injury caused thereby,
except as to conductors and engineers voluntarily operating unsafe cars or
engines; and that any contract, expressed or implied, made by any employ6,
to waive the benefit of the section shall be void. In an action for the death of
an employ6, the railway company by way of affirmative defense alleged that
the plaintiff was a member of the Relief and Hospital department, organized
for the purpose of establishing and managing a fund for the payment of defi-
nite amounts to employ~s. Plaintiff had received the benefits of the organi-
zation after his injury and before his death, and the company maintained that
they were released from any obligation. The court being evenly divided they
were forced to affirm the judgment of the court below, not allowing the ad-
ministratrix to recover. Pope, J., in the main opinion maintained that the
contract, because of the constitutional provision, was null and void, and being
null and void could not be made valid by receiving any benefits thereunder.
Wallingfordv. 2?. R. Co., 26 S. C. 258, 2 S. E. 1g.
MASTER AND SERVANT-PROXIMATE CAUSE--NEGLIGENCE-MARYLAND STEEL
Co. OF SPARROWS POINT v. MARNEY, 42 Atl. 60 (Md.).-Defendant, who was
plaintiff's employer, knowingly employed an incompetent workman whose
negligent management of certain apparatus brought a number of other
workmen into danger. Plaintiff, a skilled workman, whose business was in
the use of the same apparatus, attempted to prevent the injury to his fellow
servant, and in doing so voluntarily entered into danger. He was injured
and sued his employer. Held, that the negligence of his fellow servant
-was the proximate cause of the injury, and that the plaintiff's action in in-
terposing to prevent injury to the other employds was not negligence per se.
A judgment in favor of the servant was affirmed.
MORTGAGE-ASSIGNMiENT-IMPLIED WARRANTY-WALLER V. STAPLY, 77 N.
W. Rep. 570 (Iowa).-An assignment of a mortgage carries with it an implied
warranty of the genuineness of the mortgage.
M UNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-APPROPRIATIONS-CHARITIES--STATE EX. REL.
ORR V. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS ET AL. (PROTESTANT ORPHANS' HOME ET AL.
INTERVENERS) 24 South. R. 666 (La.).-Constitution of the State of Louisiana
declares that "no money shall be taken from the public treasury, directly or
indirectly, in aid of any church, sect." etc. _e-id-is refers to public treas-
ury of the state, and not to appropriations made by Common Councils of
cities, or to money taken from city treasuries. Breaux and Muller, J. J., dis-
senting.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-BONDS FOR LOCATION OF COUNTY SEAT-CURA-
TIvE AcT-VALIDITY-SCHNECK V. CITY OF JEFFERSONVILLE, 52 N. E. (Ind.)
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212.-The Common Council of defendant city on August 8, 1876, passed an
ordinance authorizing the issuing of twenty year negotiable bonds to fund an
indebtedness created by the city, arising out of expenses incident to procur-
ing the removal of a county seat and its location in the municipality, and of
the necessary public buildings. By the decision rendered in June, 1896. in
Myers v. City of Jfersonville, 145 Ind. 431. th6 validity of these bonds and
an attempt of the city to refund them. under the law then existing, was de-
nied, although the power of the Legislature to levy a special tax on the muni-
cipality to pay all the cost of the location was affirmed, on the ground that the
municipality receives a special benefit from the location of the county seat
within its limits. The Const. Art. 13, § i, as amended March 14, i88i, pro.
hibits the creation of city debts beyond a certain amount. A certain act was
passed after the adoption of the constitution legalizing the above bonds
issued before the adoption of the constitution. Held, valid, no vested rights hav-
ing intervened, although the city indebtedness, with such bonds, exceeds the
constitutional limit. Although the location of the county seat and erection of
the necessary buildings are not '" public improvements or public works" with-
in the meaning of the statute authorizing the city to donate money or bonds,
yet they are of a nature affording such color of authority that the Common
Council in issuing them will be presumed to have acted under the supposed
authority of the statute and its requirements. The curative act, passed after
the decision (supra) holding the bonds invalid, is not an attempt by the Legis-
lature to exercise judicial-power in violation of Const. Art. 7, § 1. One judge
dissenting.
MUNICIPAL CRPORATIONS-CITY ORDINANCE-WATERING STREET CAR
TRACKS-STATE v. CANAL & C. R. R. Co., 24 South. R. 265 (La.).-A city ordi-
nance of New Orleans requires corporations operating street electric cars
within the city limits, upon tracks laid down in public streets, to water their
tracks so as to effectually lay the dust within their tracks. Held, that such an
ordinance is a valid one. as being a legal exercise of the police power of the
city. It is not unreasonable, as it tends to promote the comfort and conven-
ience of passengers, as well as of inhabitants of the city.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs-CoNTRACT FOER REPAIRS-CITY OF KANSAS CITY
v. HANSON ET AL, 55 Pac. 513 (Kan.).-One of the provisions in a contract made
by a city for the pavement of a street was that tie contractor should give a
bond to keep the pavement in good order for five years. The city assessed
the abutting owners to obtain the money to pay the contractor. Held, that
the assessment could not be enforced. As the contractor must have charged a
higher price because of his agreement to keep the pavement in good order,
this was an attempt to charge the abutting proprietors for the repair of the
pavement of a street. This cannot be done. When the street is once paved
the duty of repairing the same is thrown on the city at large.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-REGULATION OF HACKS--REASONABLENESS OF
ORmNANCES-Ex-PARTE BATTis---4 8 S. W . Rep. 513 (Tex.).-An ordinance mak-
ing it misdemeanor to ." stop, stand or detain" any carriage or vehicle used in
carrying passengers or freight on certain named streets, or in front of public
hotels, except when actually engaged in loading or unloading passengers or
or freight. Held, unreasonable and void.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-VALIDITY OF APPROPRIATIONS-ORDINANCES-
CONCLUSIVENESS-CITY OF CHICAGO ET AL. v. NICHOLS. 52 N. E. (IIL) 359.--An
order was issued for the expenditure of a further sum for lighting the streets,
after the City Council had appropriated a certain sum for lighting the city.
By Rev. St. c. 24 § qo, no expense can be incurred by the city for any purpose
in excess of the amount provided therefor in the annual appropriation bill,
unless warranted by some "casualty" or " accident." Held, that the con-
struction of elevated railroads and depots in the streets, whereby the streets
were darkened, and the combination, though unlawful, of electric and gas
lighting companies, whereby the prices of lighting were raised, is not such
"casualty" or "accident," nor is the declaration of the City Council that it is
such conclusive in a court of, law.
PROPERTY-EASEMENTS-MOON V. MILLS, 77 N. W. 926 (Mich.).-The owner
of property, abutting on an alley twelve feet wide had a perpetual right of way
over it, in common with other abutters, and maintained an outside stairway
and platform over the alley, thirty-five inches wide, which did not incommode
the other abutters. The alley was never dedicated to the public by any fiat.
Held, that he could not be compelled to remove the obstructions. One of the
owners in common of a way, who erects an obstruction on his part, beneficial
to himself, and which does not tend to incommode one who has an equal right,
cannot be compelled to remove such obstruction.
PROPERTY-GIFT CAUSA MORTIS-DELIVERY-CAYLOR v. CAYLok's ESTATE, 52
N. E. (Ind.) 465.-Deceased, an hour before her death, called for her nephew,
and being told he was not present, directed her husband to deliver certain per-
sonal property of hers which he had then in his possession to her nephew, to
whom she declared she wished to give all her property; and the husband
promised to carry out her request. Held, sufficient to establish a donatio
causa vzortis in favor of the nephew, although there was no manual delivery
of the property either to him or to deceased's husband. Compare with Liebe
v. Battman, 54 Pac. 179, YALE LAW JOURNAL. Vol. VIII, p. 102, where, under
the circumstances of the case, the court held there was no gift.
PROPERTY-MEcirANICS' LIENS-PRIORITY OF VENDORS' LIENS-COLEY ET
AL. v. BLACK, 48 S. W. Rep. 1075 (Kent.).-A statute providing that one who
performs labor and furnishes materials in the erection of a building "' shall
have a lien thereon, and on the land upon which such improvements may have
been made. or on any interest the owner has in the same, to secure the amount
thereof." Held. that the lien of a vendor of the land, which extends to build-
ings subsequently erected thereon, is superior to mechanics' lien as given in
above statute. Guffy, J., dissenting.
PROPERTY-RFEPLEVIN OF PROPERTY EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION-PRESCOTT V.
STARKEY ET AL., 41 Atl. 1021 (Vt).-Vermont statutes provide thatwhen goods
are unlawfully taken or detained, or when goods which are attached or taken
in execution are claimed by a person other thai the defendant in the suit or
debtor in execution, they may be replevied. Goods of a defendant that were
exempt from attachment or execution were attached. Held, that these goods
could not be replevied by the defendant. Tyler and Thompson, J. J:, dissented
on the ground that exempt property taken by an officer on attachment is
wrongfully taken and is not taken under the attachment.
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REvENUE AcT-TLEGRAMs-DUTY TO STAMP-KIRK V. WESTERN TEL. Co.,
go Fed. Rep. 8og.-Under act of Congress of June 18, 1898, z is, providing
that a Telegraph Co. shall incur a penalty for transmitting a message not
stamped as required therein; and § 7, providing that one who shall "make,
sign, or issue" an instrument not properly stamped, shall be subject to a fine.
Held, that it is the duty of the maker or signer of the message offered for
transmission to affix the stamp.
SuRETy-EXTENSION OF TiME-KAUFFMAN V. ROWAN ET UX., 42 Atl. 25
(Pa.). -The man primarilyliable on a debt secured by a mortgage on his wife's
lands, contracted in writing with the mortgagees to make certain payments.
They on their part agreed on such payments being made that the time of the
maturity of the mortgage should be extended one year. The mortgagees
expressly stipulated that in no way should their rights for the enforcement of
the mortgage be relinquished or prejudiced. The money was not paid. Held,
that even though the wife be considered a surety for her husband's debt, she
is not released by such extension of time.
ToRTs-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-NEGLIGENCE AFTER KNOWLEDGE OF
PLAINTIFF'S PERIL-GENRAL AND SPECIAL FINDINGS-KREUZER V. PITTSBURGH,
C. C. & ST. L. Ry. Co., 52 N. E. (Ind.) 22.-Where a child of seven and a
half years fell asleep at a crossing and was run over by a railroad train, the
jury found that it was daylight, in a populous city, approaching a crossing,
where children were liable to be, and that the sleeping child was in plain
view from the engine for 3oo feet from the crossing, so that the fireman and
engineer could have seen him had they looked. It was also found that the
child knew that trains were run thereon, and had capacity sufficient to under-
stand that, if he remained on the track, he was liable to be run over. Held,
sufficient to show contributory negligence so conclusively as to prevail over a
general verdict for plaintiff; also, that the rule that a person, placed in peril by
his own negligence, can nevertheless recover if the person inflicting the injury
could have prevented it by ordinary care after discovering the situation, does
not apply, although the train was proceeding negligently at an excessive rate
of speed and the bell was not rung. McCabe, J., dissenting, holds that it
was not a matter of law, but a question for the jury to decide what amount
of intelligence is comprised in the "ordinary" intelligence of any boy seven
and a half years old. Also, since the negligence of the boy was found to be
antecedent to that of the trainmen, and that the latter, if they had used ordin-
ary care, could have seen him in time to avoid running over him, their negli-
gence, and not his, was the proximate cause of the injury. That the rule in
Indiana, and most of the states, is different, he strenuously denies, after an
exhaustive review of the cases. For a very similar case, agreeing with" this
dissent, see Pickett v. R. -R., 117 N. C., 6W5, 53 Am. St. R. 6ii.
Loss OF VESSEL-NEGLIGENCE OF OFFICERS.-WILLIAMS V. HAYS, 52 N. E.
(N. Y.) 589.-The rule that a person of unsound mind is responsible for his
torts the same as if he were of sound mind, held. not to apply to a case
where a vessel was lost by the negligence of her master, who had become
temporarily insane through exhaustion caused by his efforts to save her dur-
ing a storm. The court considered it a case for applying the maxims, " The
law intends what is agreeable to reason; in does not suffer an absurdity," and
"Impossiblity is an excuse in law, and there is no obligation to perform im-
possible things." Bartlett, J., dissenting.
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TORTS-RAILROADS-CLLISIONS AT CROSSING-EvIDENCE-CONNOLLY V. N.
Y. CEN. & H. R. R. Co., 55 N. Y. Supp. ix8.-Plaintiff claimed that decedent
was killed by the negligence of a railroad's employees in starting a train over
a street railway crossing when the car which decedent was driving was about
twenty-five feet from the railroad track. To rebut the charge of negligence
and to show contributory negligence on plaintiff's part a contract between the
railroad and the street car company, over whose tracks decedent was driving,
and requiring street cars to come to a full stop not less than ten feet from the
track and the conductor of the car to go on the track to look for approaching
trains, was sought to be put in evidence, but was excluded in plaintiff's object-
ing. Held, two judges dissenting, error, since it gives the engineer of the rail-
road the right to assume that the car would come to a full stop before reach-
iug the track; and this, although defendant offered no evidence to show what
connection decedent's company had with the street car company that was
party to the contract.
TRADE MARKs-LAoR IJNIoNs-SMALZ V. WOOLEY ET AL., 41 At. 939 (N. J.).
Reversing 39 At. 539.-Bill to enjoin the use of a trade mark and label imitating
and counterfeiting a trade mark and label adopted and filed by the Union Hat
Makers' Association of Newark, in accordance with New Jersey statutes.
Statute held constitutional and the suit thereon maintainable. The court also
held that on general principles the bill was sufficient. The grounds of decision
in Weener v. Brayton, 152 Mass. 1oI, 2s N. E. 46, discussed and criticised.
The New Jersey court held that it is not necessary that the person or asso-
ciation claiming a trade mark should itself own or sell the articles to which it
is applied. Neither is it necessary that the trade mark should indicate the
particular person or persons from whom the article to which it is applied gets
the quality it marks. For a Kentucky case to the same effect see Hetterman
et al. v. Powers et al., 43 S. W. 18o, YALE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. VII, 239.
TRusrFEs-CouNTY JUDGEs-LIABILITY FOR PRIVATE TRusT FUNDS-AiDFm-
SON ET AL. v. ROBERTS ET AL., 487 S. W. Rep. 847 (Mo.).-A certain fund was
directed by a testator to be paid to the judges of the County Court, to be
vested in said court as a permanent "fund" for certain charitable uses. Held,
that the County Court as such was the real trustee, and hence when the
judges of said court turned over the fund to the county treasurer they placed
the fund in the only proper repository for funds that thelCounty Court had
the management of, and had thus fulfilled their duty and were not responsible
for the misappropriation by the treasurer. Gautt and Robinson, J. J., dis.
sented on the ground that the County Court, as such, could not be trustee, but
only the judges as individuals, and hence the judges were responsible for
greater diligence than the mere turning over of the fund to the treasurer.
